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CURING A MONUMENTAL ERROR: THE
PRESUMPTIVE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEN
COMMANDMENTS DISPLAYS
PETER IRONS*

Introduction
I will argue in this essay that any permanent display of the Ten
Commandments on public property is presumptively unconstitutional as a
violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.1 As a prefatory note, among the cases I will discuss
is one from Haskell County, Oklahoma, which involved a Ten Commandments
monument on the courthouse lawn of the county seat of Stigler.2 In 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for

* Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of California, San Diego; B.A., Antioch
College; M.A. and Ph.D., Boston University Graduate School; J.D., Harvard Law School.
Professor Irons has written extensively on issues of law and religion. His book, God on Trial:
Dispatches from America’s Religious Battlefields (2007), from which select portions of the present
text are drawn, includes a chapter on Ten Commandments cases. A longer discussion of the Ten
Commandments cases will appear in his forthcoming book, Legal Literacy: A Guided Tour of the
American Legal System (2011). Mr. Irons can be contacted by e-mail at pirons@dssmail.ucsd.edu..
The author would like to thank Professor Rick Tepker and the editors and staff of the Law
Review for organizing the Symposium for which this essay was prepared, and for inviting him to
speak. The author extends a special word of gratitude to Georgeann Roye, the managing editor,
who devoted many hours to guiding this essay to publication.
1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), rev=g 450 F.
Supp. 2d 1273 (E.D. Okla. 2006), reh’g denied en banc, 574 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
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the Tenth Circuit that the monument be removed; it was subsequently moved to
nearby private property.3
I have divided this essay into five parts. Part I briefly reviews the Supreme
Court’s rulings on Establishment Clause cases—from Everson v. Board of
Education in 1947 through more recent cases on prayers in public schools and
Christmas-season displays of Nativity scenes and (in a bow to ecumenism)
Jewish menorahs—and the various judicial “tests” that have been applied in such
cases. Part II discusses the Court’s decisions in three Ten Commandments cases:
Stone v. Graham, decided in 1980, and the conflicting rulings in McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, jointly argued and
decided in 2005.
Part III subjects Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden to
critical scrutiny; he joined the majority to invalidate the courthouse display of the
Ten Commandments in the McCreary case, but wrote separately (without joining
the plurality opinion) in Van Orden to uphold a Decalogue monument on the
Texas State Capitol grounds. Part IV examines the “confusion” resulting from
Breyer’s concurrence and its impact on lower-court judges who were forced, in
subsequently decided cases, to determine whether a Ten Commandments display
was more like McCreary or Van Orden, and the results those judges reached.
Part V discusses the case of Green v. Haskell County Board of
Commissioners, in which a local resident challenged a Ten Commandments
monument installed on the courthouse lawn in 2004 with the approval of the
county commissioners.4 A federal district judge upheld the display of the
monument in 2006,5 but a federal appellate panel reversed that decision in 2009.6
The County’s request for en banc review was denied later that year by a six-tosix vote of the full appellate bench.7 The county commissioners’ lawyers
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, asserting the need to resolve a
purported “circuit split” between the Tenth Circuit panel and those in differently
decided cases,8 but the Court denied the certiorari petition on March 1, 2010.9
In a brief Conclusion, I will issue a challenge to defenders of Decalogue
displays in the form of questions and a “modest proposal” to replace the Haskell
County monument with one that is purely secular and will urge the adoption, in

3. 130 S. Ct. 1687; Rhett Morgan, Stigler Monument Moves to New Home, OKLAHOMAN
(West), Mar. 18, 2010, at 22.
4. See 568 F.3d at 788.
5. See 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1296-97.
6. See 568 F.3d at 788, 809.
7. See 574 F.3d at 1235.
8. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Green, 130 S. Ct.
1687 (2010) (No. 09-531), 2009 WL 3614470.
9. See 130 S. Ct. 1687.
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pending and future cases, of the rule that such displays are presumptively
unconstitutional. Short of that, I argue that judges should apply the
“endorsement” test, thus sparing federal judges and Supreme Court Justices the
difficult task of deciding whether a challenged display is more like McCreary or
Van Orden.
I. Looking for Directions: A Brisk Hike Along the Establishment
Clause Trail
A. Blazing the Trail: From Ratification to Incorporation
Surprisingly, not until 1947 did the Supreme Court decide its first
Establishment Clause case,10 some 156 years after ratification of the First
Amendment.11 The reason for this lengthy delay requires a brief explanation of
the so-called incorporation doctrine. By its terms, the First Amendment applies
only to congressional enactments.12 This presumably leaves state and local
governments free to legislate on issues of religion, speech, press, assembly, and
petition. And many state and local governments have done so in the past, often in
ways that allowed punishment for supposedly harmful expressions of religious
and political beliefs. Challenges to such laws on First Amendment grounds were
uniformly rejected by federal judges until 1925,13 when the Supreme Court wrote,
in the case of Gitlow v. New York, “[W]e may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.”14
This “incorporation” of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed federal judicial review of
state and local laws challenged as First Amendment violations and was followed
in 1940 by a similar incorporation of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause in
Cantwell v. Connecticut.15 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a state

10. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1999) (observing that the Bill
of Rights was ratified December 15, 1791).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
13. See PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS BATTLEFIELDS
16-17 (2007).
14. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Ironically, the Court in Gitlow affirmed the conviction and
prison sentence of a Communist activist who had distributed a “Manifesto” advocating a future—
but not imminent—revolution against the capitalist system. See id. at 655-59, 672.
15. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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law requiring official licensing for the public distribution of religious literature
that was enforced only against Jehovah’s Witnesses.16
B. Starting at the Trailhead: The Everson Case and the “Neutrality”
Doctrine
It was only a matter of time after the Gitlow and Cantwell rulings until the
Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment, applying it to state laws. This happened in 1947 in the case of
Everson v. Board of Education.17 At that time, the New Jersey township of
Ewing had no high schools, either public or private, so high-school students
attended public or Catholic parochial schools in the neighboring city of Trenton.18
Since the township also lacked school buses, students whose parents or friends
did not drive them to school used public buses.19 To cover the bus-fare costs,
Ewing offered tax-funded subsidies to parents who requested them,20 an average
of $40 per family and a yearly outlay of less than $1000.21
Arch Everson, a taxpayer in the township, challenged the subsidies in state
court, arguing that they violated the Establishment Clause.22 After the New
Jersey courts ruled against him, Everson sought review in the Supreme Court.23
The resulting decision produced an odd split between the Justices. Writing for
the majority in a five-to-four decision, Justice Hugo Black upheld the
reimbursement program, analogizing the bus-fare subsidies to such taxpayerfunded “public safety” services as police and fire protection, although he
conceded that the subsidies provided aid to parents with children in church-run
schools and thus indirectly to the churches themselves.24 The four Everson
dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Wiley Rutledge, answered that the subsidies
gave “aid and encouragement to religious instruction” in parochial schools.25 In
Rutledge’s view, the purpose of the Establishment Clause “was to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion.”26

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 301-03; IRONS, supra note 13, at 18-19.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See id. at 30 n.7 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See id. at 19-20 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 3 (majority opinion).
See id. at 56 n.51 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); IRONS, supra note 13, at 21.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3-5 (majority opinion).
See id. at 4.
See id. at 3, 17-18.
Id. at 28, 45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Id. at 31-32.
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Nevertheless, and herein lies the enduring significance of the Everson case, not
a single Justice took issue with Black’s exposition—seemingly at odds with his
approval of the bus-fare subsidy program—of the essential meaning of the
Establishment Clause.27 After a lengthy historical review of the persecution
inflicted on religious dissenters by the established churches of England and the
American colonies, and the revulsion of the First Amendment’s framers from
these practices, which included fines, imprisonment, torture, and even death,
Black quoted the words of Thomas Jefferson.28 In his famous letter in 1802 to
the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, who had complained about being taxed to
support the established Congregational Church, President Jefferson replied that
the Establishment Clause was designed to erect “a wall of separation between
church and State.”29 “That wall,” Justice Black added, “must be kept high and
impregnable.”30
The most important sentence in Black’s opinion affirmed that the
Establishment Clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary.”31 Nor, he might have added, does it require the state to be their
advocate. In my opinion, applying the “neutrality” doctrine to the Ten
Commandments displays discussed below requires either their removal from
public places or, at the least, the adoption of formal policies that allow, on a truly
“viewpoint-neutral” basis, the equal display of sentiments by groups such as
humanists or (heaven forbid!) even atheists.
C. Sticking to the Trail: The School-Prayer Cases
The Everson decision evoked minimal public comment, either favorable or
critical; apparently people saw little harm in subsidizing bus fares in New Jersey.
Fifteen years later, however, the Court touched a live wire in American society
by striking down a longstanding and widely followed practice of beginning school
days with the following prayer: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our
27. See id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 31-32, 46-47 (Rudledge, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 8-10, 16 (majority opinion).
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge et al., Comm. of the Danbury Baptist
Ass’n of Conn. (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html; see also
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
30. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Today’s Religious Right activists—and historically even some
Supreme Court Justices, see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)—make much of the fact that that the words “separation of church and state” do not
appear in the Constitution. Although this is true, Black’s quotation from Jefferson’s letter provides
a precedential “gloss” on the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause, especially
considering that Everson has not been overruled and remains good law.
31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
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Country.”32 This prayer had been adopted in the 1950s by the New York
Regents, who control the state’s education system.33 It would be hard to imagine
a more innocuous prayer, but it offended Steven Engel and other parents in the
Long Island suburb of New Hyde Park, who sued the school board and its
president, William Vitale, alleging that the “Regents’ Prayer” violated the
Establishment Clause.34 Ruling in 1962, the Supreme Court invalidated this daily
religious practice in Engel v. Vitale.35 As he had in the Everson case, Justice
Black wrote for the Court and again referenced Jefferson’s “wall of separation”
for support.36 Black stated that the Establishment Clause “must at least mean
that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government.”37
Although most Jewish and mainstream Protestant leaders applauded the Engel
ruling,38 more conservative prelates and pastors reacted with outrage.39 Cardinal
Francis Spellman of New York professed to be “shocked and frightened,”40 while
evangelist Billy Graham claimed that the decision marked “another step toward
the secularization of the United States.”41 George Andrews, Alabama
Democratic representative to the U.S. House, complained that the Court had “put
the Negroes in the schools and now they’ve driven God out.”42 Seventy-five
congressmen of both parties introduced bills to return prayer to classrooms
through legislation or constitutional amendment.43
The Supreme Court struck down another devotional ritual in 1963, banishing
mandatory recitations of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible verses in public-school
classrooms.44 This case began at the high school attended by Donna and Roger
32. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422; see also Anthony Lewis, Both Houses Get Bills to Lift Ban on
School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1962, at 1 (reporting on Congressional reaction to the June
25 Engel decision); Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, at 113
[hereinafter Opinion: Prayers in School] (collecting responses to the Everson ruling from various
public figures).
33. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422-23.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 425.
37. Id.
38. See Lewis, supra note 32, at 20 (reporting support from the Synagogue Council of
America and the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs).
39. See id. (reporting disapproval by two Catholic cardinals, a Catholic bishop, and the
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.).
40. Opinion: Prayers in School, supra note 32.
41. Id.
42. Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, at 105.
43. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 30.
44. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Schempp in Abington Township, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia.45
Classes began every morning with a reading of ten verses from the Bible and
recital of the Lord’s Prayer, as required in all schools by state law.46 The
Schempp family belonged to the Unitarian Church, whose members reject the
Christian Trinity and are not bound to any creed.47 Writing for the Court in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Justice Tom Clark echoed
Hugo Black: “In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality.”48 Arguments that Bible reading and
prayer were only “minor encroachments on the First Amendment” did not convert
Clark.49 “The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too
soon become a raging torrent,” he replied.50
Once again, conservative pastors and politicians decried the ruling,51 but their
attempts to overturn it through constitutional amendment failed to gain the twothirds majorities needed in both houses of Congress. I mention the critical
reaction to the Court’s first school-prayer rulings by conservative religious and
political leaders because these same groups—and their followers—remain
vociferous in defending Ten Commandments displays and denounce efforts to
remove them as attacks on God and America’s “religious heritage.”
D. Stopping for Lemonade: A Break on the Trail
Three decades elapsed between the Engel and Schempp rulings and the
Supreme Court’s return to a case directly addressing school prayer.52 During this
hiatus, the Court decided an important case that crystallized the “neutrality”
principle from the Everson case into a three-prong judicial “test” for laws
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.53 In 1971, the Court struck down
laws from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provided tax-funded subsidies to
private schools—almost all Catholic—for textbooks and teacher salaries, even
though the private schools affected ostensibly limited the use of these resources
45. See id. at 206.
46. See id. at 205-07.
47. See id. at 206; IRONS, supra note 13, at 30.
48. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226.
49. Id. at 225.
50. Id.
51. See Billy Graham Voices Shock over Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 27;
Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban; Some Ask Amendments to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at
27; George Dugan, Churches Divided, With Most in Favor, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1; Fred
M. Hechinger, Wide Effect Due: Decision Will Require Change in Majority of State Systems, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1.
52. The Supreme Court decided Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, in 1963 and once again considered
school prayer nearly thirty years later in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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to “secular” instruction.54 Writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief
Justice Warren Burger devised what became known as the Lemon test: “First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”55 Laws
that failed any one of the three prongs of the Lemon test would be held
unconstitutional.56 The vice of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island laws, Burger
reasoned, was that they “entangled” state officials in deciding how much—if
any—religious content was provided by teachers and textbooks in religiousschool classes.57 Over the years since the Lemon decision, the “entanglement”
prong has rarely been employed, while the “purpose” and “effect” prongs have
been applied in dozens of cases, including the Ten Commandments cases
discussed below.58
Thirty years after the Engel decision, and now wielding the Lemon test, the
Supreme Court extended its ban on classroom prayers to graduation invocations,
ruling in 1992 that clergy-delivered prayers at such events violate the
Establishment Clause.59 The case of Lee v. Weisman involved a middle school in
Providence, Rhode Island.60 Christian ministers had delivered sectarian prayers
at the school’s graduations for years, but following complaints from the parents
of a Jewish student, Deborah Weisman, school officials recruited a rabbi to offer
the invocation, thinking that this would placate them.61 But the Weismans filed a
suit against the prayer practice itself, and the Supreme Court, in a narrow five-tofour decision, struck down the graduation prayers.62 Writing for the majority,
Justice Anthony Kennedy held that the Establishment Clause “forbids the State to
exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own high
school graduation.”63 In his opinion, Kennedy utilized what became known as the
“coercion” test, reasoning that students like Deborah Weisman felt “coerced” to
stand with bowed heads during prayers to which they objected.64 Kennedy
believed that this imposed a burden on teenagers who were subjected to “peer

54. See id. at 606-11.
55. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968),
and quoting Watz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 615.
58. See discussion infra Part II.
59. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992).
60. See id. at 581.
61. See id.; IRONS, supra note 13, at 40-41.
62. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 579, 599.
63. Id. at 596.
64. See id. at 592-98.
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pressure” to join the invocation.65 Justice Antonin Scalia responded for the
dissenters and accused the majority of driving a judicial “bulldozer” over a
hallowed American tradition of invoking God’s blessing on public events.66
The Court’s most recent school-prayer ruling illustrates its steadfastness in
sticking to precedent and principle on this divisive issue. The case of Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe involved the practice of delivering pregame
prayers at high-school football games.67 Santa Fe is a small Texas town, where
the majority of people identify with the Southern Baptist denomination and where
football games had traditionally opened with prayers delivered over the school’s
public-address system by Baptist ministers.68 After two sets of parents—one
Mormon and one Catholic—filed suit to enjoin this and other “proselytizing
practices” encouraged by school officials, the school board “resolved” the
pregame prayer issue by conducting elections in which seniors would first choose
whether a pregame “invocation” would be given at all, and if so, which fellow
student would deliver that “invocation.”69 The dissenting parents rejected this
“popular choice” alternative and continued prosecuting the lawsuit in federal
court; fearing harassment of their children, they were protected by the pseudonym
“Doe” in the case.70
After lower-court judges ruled against the school district, the Supreme Court
followed suit and struck down the pregame prayers.71 Writing for the six-to-three
majority in 2000,72 Justice John Paul Stevens dismissed the district’s claim that
the prayers constituted “private” speech, observing that “only those messages
deemed ‘appropriate’ under the District’s policy [could] be delivered”73 and that
the “invocations [were] authorized by a government policy and [took] place on
government property at government-sponsored school-related events.”74 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist issued a sharp dissent, joined by Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, accusing the majority of distorting precedent.75
“But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court’s opinion,” he
wrote.76 “[I]t bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.”77
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 593.
See id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
See id. at 294-95; IRONS, supra note 13, at 136-39.
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295-98.
See id. at 294, 299.
See id. at 299-301.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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E. Straying from the Trail: Nativity Scenes, Menorahs, and “Christmas
Clutter”
A final pair of Establishment Clause rulings will set the stage for the Ten
Commandments cases discussed below. Both cases involved challenges to
Christmas-season displays on public property. Christmas, of course, is a holiday
with both sacred and secular meaning. Christians celebrate the birth of Jesus, and
even non-Christians cannot avoid exposure to such trappings of the holiday
season as Nativity crèches. Such displays on private property do not offend the
Constitution, but their placement on public property has offended some people
enough to file lawsuits seeking their removal.
The first challenge to Nativity displays reached the Supreme Court in 1984.78
For some forty years, city workers in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, had erected a cityowned crèche as part of a Christmas-season display in a downtown park.79
Surrounding the crèche were such traditional items as candy-striped poles, a
cutout figure of a teddy bear, a Santa’s sleigh, and a large banner that offered
“Seasons Greetings” to all who viewed the display.80 Ruling on a suit filed by
local ACLU members, with supporting briefs from Jewish groups, the Supreme
Court upheld the Pawtucket display by a five-to-four margin in Lynch v.
Donnelly.81
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger conceded that “the
crèche is identified with one religious faith,” but he shied from banning its
display “at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christmas
hymns and carols in public schools and other public places.”82 Christmas, he
implied, was so embedded in the nation’s heritage that it had become as much a
secular as a religious holiday.83 Although Burger cited both the Everson and
Lemon cases,84 the latter written by himself, he focused on the “context” of the
crèche among its secular trappings in finding that “the display engender[ed] a
friendly community spirit of goodwill” during the Christmas season.85 Writing
for the dissenters, Justice William Brennan noted that “the crèche retains a
specifically Christian religious meaning”86 and reminded the majority that the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 671.
Id.
See id. at 670-71.
Id. at 685-86.
See id. at 685.
See id. at 672-73.
Id. at 685, 686.
Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Lemon test remained “the fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis,”87
arguing that the Pawtucket display violated all three prongs of the test.88
More significant than the majority and dissenting opinions in Lynch, however,
was the concurring opinion of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Although she
joined the majority to uphold the display, O’Connor wrote separately to offer a
“clarification” of the Lemon test.89 She proposed to focus the “purpose” prong
on “whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion”
and the “effect” prong on “whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.”90 O’Connor put her “endorsement” test in these words:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in
the political community. . . . Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.91
Applying this test to the Pawtucket display, O’Connor reasoned that the city “did
not intend to convey any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval
of non-Christian religions” by including a Nativity scene in its holiday display.92
The Court’s most recent foray into Christmas-season displays produced more
shifting alignments among the Justices than coaches employ in football games.
The primary reason for judicial discord in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, decided in 1989, was that the case involved two
separate displays in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.93 One display, located
in the rotunda of the county courthouse, consisted solely of an elaborate crèche
topped by an angel holding a banner that proclaimed, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo.”94
The second display, outside the nearby City-County Building, featured an
eighteen-foot Jewish menorah flanked by a forty-five-foot Christmas tree, along
with a banner declaring the city’s “Salute to Liberty.”95

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 696 n.2.
See id. at 698-704.
Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 691.
See 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).
Id. at 579-80.
See id. at 581-82, 587.
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Ruling on the County’s appeal from Third Circuit rulings against both
displays, the Supreme Court ordered the crèche removed but allowed the menorah
to remain.96 The difference seemed to be the Christmas tree, and the somewhat
less sectarian nature of the menorah,97 which is not a sacred symbol for most
branches of Judaism. Candy canes and teddy bears might have saved the crèche
in Pawtucket, but the placement of one as “the single element” of the courthouse
display in Pittsburgh made its “religious meaning unmistakably clear” to Justice
Harry Blackmun, who wrote for the five-Justice majority in Allegheny, with
several Justices joining one or more parts of his opinion.98 By contrast, in a
separate opinion for six Justices, Blackmun said that the effect of “placing a
menorah next to a Christmas tree is to create an ‘overall holiday setting’ that
represents both Christmas and Chanukah—two holidays, not one.”99 Justice
O’Connor again employed her “endorsement” test, which yielded different
outcomes with regard to the crèche and the menorah.100 O’Connor joined various
parts of Blackmun’s opinions, with three other Justices voting to strike down
both displays and another four voting to uphold both.101 Again, “context”
mattered for O’Connor, who seemed satisfied with what I call “Christmas clutter”
in deciding which displays met her Establishment Clause test.102
The eight Establishment Clause cases just discussed, which were selected from
scores the Supreme Court has decided since 1947, have great bearing on the Ten
Commandments cases discussed below. First, the Court’s adoption of the
“neutrality” principle in Everson provides, in my opinion, a touchstone for
decisions in all religion cases, giving neither side an advantage in disputes over
the proper role of religion in the public sphere. Second, the school-prayer cases
were, in a sense, “easy” for the Court to decide, since public-school students form
a “captive audience” in classrooms and even at football games, subject to peer
pressure to conform and official “coercion” to participate in religious activities.
Third, the Christmas-season display cases proved more difficult to decide, and
produced more judicial discord, because they involved a holiday with both
religious and secular meaning and a longstanding national “heritage” of
celebrating this holiday. Whether permanent displays of the Ten Commandments
in public places reflect a similar mixed “heritage” of acknowledging God, or
instead serve the sectarian purpose of promoting obedience to his commands,
remains a subject of continuing debate and division in American society.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 588-89, 601-02, 620-21.
See id. at 614-21.
See id. at 598-99.
Id. at 614.
See id. at 626-27, 637 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 577.
See id. at 626-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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II. “I Am the Lord Thy God”: The Court and the Commandments
A. Inscribed in Stone: What Should Have Been—But Wasn’t—The Court’s
Only Ten Commandments Decision
The Supreme Court’s first Ten Commandments case, which the Court decided
in 1980, was so “easy” for a majority of five Justices that it was decided in an
unsigned, per curiam opinion, without benefit of briefs and oral argument.103 In
seven paragraphs, the Court’s opinion in Stone v. Graham struck down a
Kentucky law that mandated the posting of the Decalogue on the walls of all the
state’s public-school classrooms.104 The statute provided that the documents
should be paid for by private contributions, collected by the state treasurer, and
that each copy should include, in “small print” after the last commandment, the
following statement: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization
and the Common Law of the United States.”105
Armed with the Lemon test, the Stone majority rejected the State’s claim, set
forth in the State’s petition for certiorari, that this addendum to the Decalogue
copies expressed a valid secular purpose for their classroom display. “The preeminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is
plainly religious in nature,” the majority held.106 “The Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,” the Court continued,
“and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that
fact.”107 The Decalogue’s prohibition of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury
could not conceal its primary concern with “the religious duties of believers:
worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord’s name in
vain, and observing the Sabbath Day.”108 The majority concluded that the statute
violated the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test “and thus the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution.”109
Chief Justice Warren Burger and three colleagues dissented from this summary
disposal of the Stone case, but only Justice William Rehnquist issued a dissenting
opinion.110 Rehnquist made two points in his reply to the majority. He first
argued that the Court should defer to the “secular purpose articulated by the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
See id. at 39-40.
Id. at 39 n.1, 41 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)).
Id. at 41.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 43.
See id.
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[state] legislature” and the decision of the State’s supreme court.111 He then
agreed with the State’s claim that “the Ten Commandments have had a
significant impact on the development of secular legal codes of the Western
World,” dismissing the majority’s “emphasis on the religious nature of the first
part of the Ten Commandments [as] beside the point.”112
The Stone case, incidentally, did not hinge on the supposed
“impressionability” of students, as Justice Stephen Breyer mistakenly claimed in
his Van Orden concurrence, which I will discuss below.113 In my view, Supreme
Court Justices and lower-court judges would have been spared much time and
effort in later Decalogue cases had they heeded and followed the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Stone case. But some of them didn’t, thus extending this essay.
B. A Battle of Two Cousins: The McCreary Case
McCreary County, Kentucky, is tucked into the Cumberland Mountains in the
state’s southeastern corner.114 It is small and poor, and its residents are
overwhelmingly Republican in politics and Southern Baptist in religion.115 The
county seat, Whitley City, with a population of just over one thousand, is
dominated by the red-brick county courthouse.116 It is not the kind of place from
which one would expect a major constitutional case to reach the Supreme Court
and divide the Justices in their decisions.
Nevertheless, that legal journey began on September 14, 1999, when the
county’s elected leader, Jimmie W. Greene, posted a copy of the Ten
Commandments on the wall of the courthouse lobby at a ceremony attended by
American Legion members and local pastors.117 Greene, a lifelong Baptist, was
“shocked” when he was sued by his own cousin, Louanne Walker,118 who had
been raised in the same Baptist church. “You know,” Walker said, “this is a
small county, and I’d say most of the people here are in favor of having the Ten
Commandments posted in the courthouse.”119 “I hope they realize this is not a
statement about the Ten Commandments. I’m not against the Ten
Commandments. I’m just a firm believer in separation of church and state.”120
After the Kentucky ACLU filed suit against both McCreary County and
neighboring Pulaski County, which had installed a similar Commandments
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 43-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 45 & n.2.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
See IRONS, supra note 13, at 182.
See id. at 183-84.
See id. at 182.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186
Id.
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display in its courthouse, the case took an abrupt turn before it reached a judicial
hearing.121 The counties’ lawyer, aware of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Stone v.
Graham against posting the Decalogue in Kentucky schools, advised his clients
to expand their courthouse displays to include such documents as the national
motto of “In God We Trust,” a statement by Abraham Lincoln that “the Bible is
the best gift God has ever given to man,” and the Mayflower Compact.122 This
ploy, however, did not impress federal district judge Jennifer Coffman, named to
the bench by President Bill Clinton.123 After a hearing in April 2000, she issued a
preliminary injunction ordering county officials to remove the new displays
immediately and not erect any similar displays in the future.124 “While a display
of some of these documents may not have the effect of endorsing religion in
another context,” she wrote, “they collectively have the overwhelming effect of
endorsing religion, in the context of [these] display[s].”125 Coffman added that
“the only unifying element among the documents is their reference to God, the
Bible, or religion.”126
This judicial defeat did not deter the county officials, who were determined to
keep the Commandments in their courthouses. Advised by a new volunteer
lawyer, Mathew Staver of the religious conservative legal group Liberty Counsel,
they again revised the displays to surround the Decalogue with copies of the
Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and all four
verses of “The Star-Spangled Banner.”127 A poster next to the exhibits identified
the documents as “The Foundations of American Law and Government
Display.”128 This tactic did not impress Judge Coffman, who ruled in June 2001
that the new displays were a “sham.”129 “[P]lacing [the Decalogue] among these
patriotic and political documents, with no other religious symbols or moral codes
of any kind, imbues it with a national significance constituting endorsement” of
its religious message by county officials, she wrote.130

121. See ACLU of Ky. v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU of
Ky. v. McCreary County (McCreary I), 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2000); IRONS, supra
note 13, at 185, 187-88.
122. IRONS, supra note 13, at 187-88; see also Pulaski, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 695-96; McCreary I,
96 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
123. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 188-89.
124. See Pulaski, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 703; McCreary I, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
125. Pulaski 96 F. Supp. 2d at 699; McCreary I, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
126. Pulaski, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 699; McCreary I, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
127. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 190-91; see also ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County
(McCreary II), 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846-47 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
128. McCreary II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
129. See id. at 848-49, 850-51.
130. Id. at 851; see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 192.
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Ruling on the counties’ appeal from this decision in December 2003, a threejudge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with Judge
Coffman in a split decision.131 Writing for the majority, Judge Eric Clay quoted
from the poster that explained the “Foundations” display: “The Ten
Commandments provide the moral background of the Declaration of
Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition.”132 Clay found nothing in
the displays connecting the two documents, noting that Thomas Jefferson, the
Declaration’s primary author, did not believe in “the God of the Bible (and thus
the Ten Commandments), but the God of deism.”133 The “patently religious
purpose” behind the “Foundations” display, Clay concluded, violated the
Establishment Clause.134 In a biting dissent from this ruling, Judge James Ryan
accused his colleagues of displaying “an outright hostility to religion in our
nation’s public life.”135 Posting the Decalogue “in the public square
acknowledges religion, but does not endorse it,” he wrote.136
C. The “Homeless Lawyer” and the Van Orden Case
The counties’ petition for Supreme Court review of this adverse ruling crossed
paths with another Ten Commandments case, this one from the Texas state
capital of Austin.137 Home to the University of Texas and the nation’s sixteenthlargest city, Austin is far more affluent, educated, racially and ethnically diverse,
and politically liberal than McCreary and Pulaski counties.138 All they held in
common was the fact that each had a Ten Commandments display that sparked
litigation.139
Back in 1961, Texas officials authorized the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a
national service organization, to install a Ten Commandments monument on the
Texas State Capitol grounds.140 This granite slab, six feet high and three-andone-half feet wide, is headed by the words “I AM the LORD thy God” and
includes carved inscriptions of two Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and
Rho, which are common Christian shorthand symbols for “Christ.”141 Also
131. See ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 440, 462 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545
U.S. 844 (2005).
132. Id. at 443.
133. Id. at 452.
134. See id. at 453-54.
135. Id. at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
136. See id.
137. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 193 (reporting that the Supreme Court granted review for
both cases on October 12, 2004, and set oral argument for March 2, 2005).
138. See id. at 193-95.
139. See id. at 195.
140. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005) (plurality opinion).
141. See id. at 681; see also id. at 736 app., image 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reprinting a visual
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scattered around the Capitol grounds are seventeen monuments and twenty-one
historical markers, celebrating such groups as the Texas Rangers, Confederate
soldiers, pioneer women, and Texas cowboys.142
More than forty years passed between the installation of the Ten
Commandments monument and a suit demanding its removal.143 Thomas Van
Orden filed suit in late 2001, naming Texas governor Rick Perry and other state
officials as defendants.144 A graduate of Southern Methodist University’s law
school and a Vietnam veteran, Van Orden had his law license suspended by the
state bar in 1995 because he was failing to perform work for clients in his
criminal-defense practice.145 After a divorce and suffering from depression, Van
Orden lived in a tent, but frequented the state law library, located a few hundred
feet from the Capitol, passing the Decalogue monument on his way.146 His
research in the law library convinced him that the monument violated the
Establishment Clause.147
Dubbed the “homeless lawyer” by the media after his suit attracted
publicity,148 Van Orden explained, “I didn’t sue the Ten Commandments. . . . I
didn’t sue Christianity. I sued the state for putting a religious monument on
Capitol grounds. It is a message of discrimination. Government has to remain
neutral.”149 His case was assigned to federal district judge Harry Lee Hudspeth,
who ruled for the State in an October 2002 opinion.150 Applying the “purpose”
and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test, Hudspeth cited a 1961 state legislative
resolution commending the Eagles for their “efforts to reduce juvenile
delinquency,” supposedly the purpose for erecting the monument.151 Presumably,
young people who viewed it would heed its admonitions to worship God and
avoid the crimes of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury.152 The resolution,
Hudspeth wrote, “ma[de] no reference to religion” and showed a “valid secular

image of the monument).
142. See id. at 681 & n.1 (plurality opinion).
143. Id. at 682.
144. See Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 32737462, at *1-2 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 2, 2002).
145. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 196 (noting that Van Orden’s law license was under
suspension or probation from 1995 until September 2003, when Van Orden decided not to return to
the practice of law).
146. See id. at 195-97; see also Van Orden, 2002 WL 32737462, at 2.
147. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 196-97.
148. Id. at 198.
149. Id. at 197-98.
150. See Van Orden, 2002 WL 32737462.
151. Id. at *3-4; see also infra note 359.
152. IRONS, supra note 13, at 197.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

18

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

purpose” in allowing the monument’s erection.153 Noting that the monument was
only one of seventeen on the Capitol grounds, Hudspeth added that a “reasonable
observer” would not “conclude that the State [was] seeking to advance, endorse
or promote religion by permitting its display.”154
After hitching a ride to New Orleans with a law student, Van Orden argued his
appeal from this decision before a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.155 He knew that his chances were slim in this conservative circuit,
remarking, “It’s like I’m appealing to the damn Southern Baptist Convention
down there.”156 Writing for all three panel members in November 2003, Judge
Patrick Higginbotham proved Van Orden right, upholding Hudspeth’s ruling in
terms very similar to those used by the district judge.157 Applying the “purpose”
and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test, as had Judge Clay in the McCreary case,
Judge Higginbotham reached different conclusions.158 There was nothing in the
legislative record “or the events attending the monument’s installation,” he wrote,
“to contradict the secular reasons” for placing the Commandments monument on
the Capitol grounds to reflect the Eagles’ “concern about juvenile
delinquency.”159 Higginbotham reasoned that a “reasonable viewer” would look
at the Capitol and the nearby Texas Supreme Court Building and recognize the
monument’s message as “relevant to these law-giving instruments of State
government.”160
D. The Same Commandments, but Not the Same Outcome
The Supreme Court often, but not invariably, grants review in cases that
involve a “circuit split”—divergent rulings by federal appellate courts in cases
that raise similar facts and legal issues—in order to resolve such conflicts and
(hopefully) establish uniform standards to guide lower-court judges in future
cases.161 Confronted with such a split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in the
153. See Van Orden, 2002 WL 32737462, at *4-5.
154. Id. at *5.
155. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 198.
156. Id.
157. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (Judge Higginbotham’s
opinion), with Van Orden, 2002 WL 32737462, at *5 (Judge Hudspeth’s opinion).
158. Compare Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 180, 182 (finding that the Ten Commandments display
had “a valid secular purpose” and that a reasonable viewer would not conclude that Texas was
endorsing its religious message), with ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 458, 461
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the Ten Commandments display in Kentucky expressed a
predominantly religious purpose and had the “impermissible effect of endorsing religion”).
159. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 179.
160. Id. at 181.
161. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“We
granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on this question.” (internal citations
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Van Orden and McCreary cases, the Court granted petitions for certiorari in both
cases in October 2004, setting oral argument for both in March 2005.162
The Court did not, in fact, resolve the conflicting appellate rulings in the two
Commandments cases. Rather, the Court’s fractured McCreary and Van Orden
decisions not only echoed the dueling opinions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuit
panels—with equally heated rhetoric on both sides—but also left lower-court
judges scratching their heads in puzzlement, best illustrated in Green v. Haskell
County Board of Commissioners discussed below.163
Ruling on both the Kentucky and Texas cases on June 27, 2005, by separate
majorities of five-to-four, the Court banished the Commandments from the
McCreary and Pulaski county courthouses, but allowed the Decalogue monument
to remain standing on the Capitol grounds in Austin.164 Writing for the majority
in McCreary, Justice David Souter—joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O’Connor—looked to past
cases, beginning with Everson in 1947, that collectively “mandate[d]
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.”165 That principle is violated “when the government’s ostensible
object is to take sides,” Souter wrote.166 It was clear to him that the counties had
taken sides by initially posting, by itself, a religious text that rested its commands
“on the sanction of the divinity proclaimed at the beginning of the text.”167
It was also clear to Souter that subsequent displays of more secular documents
did not erase the clearly religious purpose of the first,168 which exhibited “an
unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious obligations and with
morality subject to religious sanction.”169 Souter dismissed the revised displays
as a “litigating position” adopted by county officials who “were simply reaching
for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses
constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality.”170 Rhetorically clearing
his throat, Souter concluded that “[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the
omitted)); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (“We . . . granted certiorari to
resolve a split among the Circuits . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
162. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 193.
163. See 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010); see also
discussion infra Part V.
164. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry
545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005).
165. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 849, 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
166. Id. at 860.
167. Id. at 868.
168. See id. at 869-70
169. Id. at 869.
170. Id. at 871, 873.
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claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier
displays.”171 In other words, in this case, no amount of camouflage could hide the
sectarian message of the Ten Commandments.
In a separate concurrence, Justice O’Connor dusted off her “endorsement” test,
adding a few pointed words. “It is true that many Americans find the
Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs,” she wrote,172 tacitly
acknowledging the overwhelming public support for their display in public
places.173 “But we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment,”
she added.174 The Constitution’s religion clauses, she concluded, “protect
adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in no religion at all.”175
Writing for the four dissenters in McCreary—including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas—Justice
Antonin Scalia denounced as “demonstrably false [the] principle that the
government cannot favor religion over irreligion.”176 Scalia expressed his view
that the Establishment Clause allows “disregard of polytheists and believers in
unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists,” and later
noted the “overwhelming majority of religious believers” who support religious
practices and symbols in public places.177 Scalia unabashedly counted heads and
found a majority on the side of the Decalogue.178
Obviously, the Supreme Court also counts heads when its members vote on
cases. The majority coalition in McCreary shifted to the other side in the Van
Orden case, with Justice Breyer jumping over the “wall of separation” to cast the
deciding vote to support the Texas monument, although he did not join the
plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.179 Rehnquist’s opinion was brief
171. Id. at 872.
172. Id. at 884 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
173. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 208. Numerous polls indicate that roughly seventy percent of
the general public support—or at least do not oppose—such displays. See, e.g., Albert L.
Winseman, Americans: Thou Shalt Not Remove the Ten Commandments, GALLUP, Apr. 12, 2005,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/15817/americans-thou-shalt-remove-ten-commandments.aspx
(reporting polling results showing 76% of Americans in favor of allowing Texas to keep the
monument at issue in Van Orden).
174. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 884 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. a 893, 900.
178. See id. at 894 (noting that “[t]he three most popular religions in the United States,
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—which combined account for 97.7% of all believers—are
monotheistic” and endorse the Ten Commandments as “divine prescriptions for a virtuous life”).
Apparently, it did not occur to Scalia that Southern Baptists like Louanne Walker might object to
being “disregarded” by the majority of her fellow Baptists in McCreary County. See supra text
accompanying notes 118-20.
179. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
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but heated and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.180 The
Chief Justice conceded the “religious significance” of the Decalogue but rejected
the premise that such significance should prohibit its public display.181
“[A]cknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our
Nation’s heritage are common throughout America,” he wrote.182 “We need only
look within our own Courtroom,” Rehnquist stated, referring to a depiction of
Moses holding tablets (inscribed in Hebrew) in a frieze that includes other
historic law-givers.183 “Simply having religious content or promoting a message
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause,” Rehnquist concluded.184
III. Straddling the “Wall of Separation,” with No Place to Stand
A. “Context and Consequences”—A Critical Dissection of Justice Breyer’s
Van Orden Concurrence
This essay would probably not have been written, and (more importantly)
much subsequent litigation would have been avoided, had Justice Stephen Breyer
not switched sides in the McCreary and Van Orden cases, joining the majority in
the former and casting, through his concurring opinion, the decisive vote in the
latter.185 This switch raises an important and intriguing question: why did Breyer
switch sides in these cases? A careful reading of his Van Orden concurrence
(which I urge readers of this essay to do for themselves) reveals, at least to me,
both the pretextual nature of his arguments in that opinion and the actual reason
for his decision to uphold the Decalogue monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds.
In his Van Orden concurrence, Breyer conceded that this was a “difficult,
borderline case.”186 Looking for factors to distinguish it from McCreary, he
found three that influenced his decision: context, secular purpose, and lack of
divisiveness over time.
Five times in his concurrence, Breyer emphasized the importance of the
“context” of the Texas monument.187 Unlike the Kentucky display, in which the
Ten Commandments initially stood alone on the courthouse wall and became
judgment).
180. See id. at 680 (plurality opinion).
181. Id. at 690.
182. Id. at 688.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 849 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S.
at 680, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment).
187. Id. at 701-02.
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surrounded only in later displays,188 the Texas monolith was set aside “in a large
park” that contained nearly forty other monuments and historical markers, none
with religious meaning.189 For Breyer, this “physical setting” provided “a strong,
but not conclusive, indication that the Commandments’ text on this monument
conveys a predominantly secular message” in a “context of history and moral
ideas.”190
A second weakness in Breyer’s concurrence stems from his repeated reference
to the supposedly “secular” nature of the Ten Commandments.191 In fact, he
contradicted himself in making this argument, since he had joined the McCreary
opinion of Justice Souter, who labeled the Decalogue “an unmistakably religious
statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to religious
sanction.”192 Nonetheless, Breyer claimed in his Van Orden concurrence that the
Decalogue “can convey . . . a secular moral message” concerning “proper
standards of social conduct” and “a historic relation between those standards and
the law.”193
A final distinguishing factor between the Kentucky and Texas cases lies in
Justice Breyer’s repeated references in his Van Orden concurrence to the
supposed community “divisiveness” or “social conflict” engendered by
McCreary and lacking in Van Orden.194 Citing the fact that forty years had
passed between the Texas monument’s installation and Thomas Van Orden’s
challenge to it as evidence that it was “unlikely to prove divisive” in Austin
(although perhaps not elsewhere in Texas), Breyer revealed in his concurrence his
real fear that the monument’s removal “might well encourage disputes concerning
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the Nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of

188. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850; see also supra text accompanying notes 117-30.
189. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
190. Id. In fairness, it is difficult to fault Justice Breyer for this emphasis on the physical setting
and “context” of the Texas monument, since that factor provided the basis for the Court’s decisions
on the Nativity-scene and menorah displays in the Lynch and Allegheny cases. See County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); see also discussion supra Part I.E.
191. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
“[i]n certain contexts, a display of . . . the Ten Commandments can convey . . . a secular moral
message.”).
192. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869; see also supra text accompanying note 169.
193. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). I will discuss below
the falsity of the supposed linkage between the religious and secular provisions of the
Commandments as “a source of American law.” See discussion infra Part III.B. Suffice it to note
here that Breyer, in my view, was simply grasping at straws in trying to conflate these differing
components to justify the Decalogue’s display in Texas.
194. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”195
But if past and potential “divisiveness” were a proper factor in judicial decisions,
the Supreme Court might not have rendered its Brown v. Board of Education196
and Roe v. Wade197 decisions, striking down school segregation and
constitutionalizing abortion rights, respectively. In my view, by raising the
“divisiveness” issue, Breyer was recoiling from the (probably unfounded)
prospect of backhoes and cranes ripping out dozens of Ten Commandments
monuments, provoking scenes of resistance by their supporters. In any event,
such fears should not deter judges from performing their duties in construing the
Constitution.
B. Are the Ten Commandments A Source of American Law?
In his Van Orden concurrence, Justice Breyer buttressed his claim that display
of the Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capitol conveyed a “predominantly
secular message” with the assertion that the “proper standards of social conduct”
contained in the Decalogue reflect the “historic relation between those standards
and the law.”198 Similar statements have been made in the writings and legal
briefs of the Decalogue’s defenders, including the Van Orden amicus brief of the
United States, which Breyer cited,199 asserting that “historians” have supported
the view “that the Ten Commandments influenced the development of American
law.”200 However, neither Breyer nor the Justice Department brief named a single
historian or cited any scholarly publication to support these assertions.201 In fact,
every reputable historian of American law (including professed Christians) has
195. Id. at 704. Though McCreary involved a display of more recent vintage, it illustrates the
kind of “divisiveness” Justice Breyer apparently feared—though even that case failed to inspire the
kind of acrimony witnessed in conjunction with other Commandments cases. IRONS, supra note
13, at 187. Still, faced with a lawsuit asking for the removal of the Ten Commandments from the
McCreary County courthouse, Jimmie Greene had vowed, “I’m not going to take them down. It’s
going to take the big man in the black robe to tell me to take them down.” Id. But when the men
and women of the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ orders for their removal, Greene
surrendered his battle to put the Commandments back in the courthouse. See id. at 211.
196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
197. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
198. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-02 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
199. Id.
200. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19-20, Van
Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500), 2005 WL 263790, at *19-20 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for
the United States], available at http://www.lc.org/ten/briefs.htm. This Liberty Counsel website
includes links to all the Supreme Court documents in both the McCreary and Van Orden cases,
including certiorari petitions, replies, briefs of parties and amicus groups, oral argument transcripts,
and opinions.
201. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698-705 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Amicus
Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 7-8.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

24

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

rejected the idea that the Commandments provided any historical foundation for
American law.202
The claim that the Commandments have provided a source of American law is
simply false. This is not an insignificant or tangential issue in debates over the
constitutionality of Decalogue displays. In every case decided thus far, the
supposed “nexus between the Commandments and American law,” to quote the
Justice Department’s brief in Van Orden, has been argued by their supporters.203
For example, as noted above, the “small print” at the bottom of the Kentucky
classroom displays of the Commandments considered in Stone v. Graham made
this statement: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly
seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States.”204 Similarly, the governing bodies of
McCreary and Pulaski counties adopted identical resolutions stating that the
Commandments were “codified in Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws.”205 The
Supreme Court brief of the McCreary defendants asserted that the Supreme
Court “has recognized the influence the Ten Commandments has had on our
system of law and government.”206 For authority, the brief cited the dissenting
opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Stone v. Graham, as well as various other
dissenting and concurring opinions—hardly dealing from a strong hand.207
If the Ten Commandments were, in fact, a source of American law, the burden
should rest upon supporters of their public display to produce some evidence of
this purported linkage. They have produced none beyond mere assertion. To the
contrary, every reputable historian of American law has disputed any such
linkage. Of course, the first, and best, place to look for such evidence is in the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787. As a historian, I have read
every word of the accounts of that convention, which resulted in a Constitution
that is “the supreme Law of the Land.”208 There is not one mention of the Ten
Commandments, or of the Bible, anywhere in James Madison’s almost verbatim
notes of the convention’s debates.209
202. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
203. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 20.
204. 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)); see also supra text
accompanying note 105.
205. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 853 (2005).
206. Brief for Petitioners at 21, McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (No. 03-1693), 2004 WL 2851009,
at *21.
207. See id. at 21 n.21.
208. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
209. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(bicentennial ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal
Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of Respondents at 20, McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (No. 031693), 2005 WL 166586, at *20 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Legal Historians].
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Nor is there any mention of the Commandments in the (admittedly much more
fragmentary) reports of the state ratifying conventions, or in the Federalist
Papers.210 To be sure, some of the laws in the American colonies were based on
biblical precepts, such as laws in the Massachusetts Bay Colony that punished
such crimes as idolatry, blasphemy, and witchcraft with death penalties.211 But
such laws, even those that stayed on the books after the Constitution was ratified,
have no legal force today. And the crimes of murder, adultery, theft, and perjury,
forbidden by the Commandments, have more ancient roots than the Bible,
stemming back to the Code of Hammurabi from the sixteenth century B.C. and
the pre-biblical laws of ancient Greece and Rome.212 These prohibitions have
been a part of “virtually every culture” in the world.213
Other legal historians agree with me on these issues. Marci Hamilton of
Cardozo Law School has written extensively on this issue, positioning herself as
“a Christian, an American, and a scholar.”214 She dismisses the argument that the
Commandments form “the ground for much of our criminal law, and therefore
constitute a legal and historical document—not a religious one” as “so weak it
ought to be rejected out of hand.”215 Hamilton notes that the first four
Commandments, as well as the admonitions to honor one’s parents and not to
covet one’s neighbor’s goods or wife, “simply cannot be enacted into law.”216 In
addition, a criminal prohibition against adultery, (as opposed to provisions
designating the act as grounds for divorce in many states) “would likely be struck
down as unconstitutional” by today’s Supreme Court.217 That leaves only
murder, theft, and perjury, which were crimes in most societies long before the
Bible was written.218
Another noted legal historian, Paul Finkelman of Albany Law School, notes
that it is even difficult to decide which of the several versions of the

210. See Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at 21 (citing JAMES MADISON ET
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788)).
211. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 2-7.
212. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 55 (1997).
213. Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at 10 n.17.
214. See Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments and American Law: Why Some Christians’
Claims to Legal Hegemony Are Not Consistent with the Historical Record, FINDLAW, Sept. 11,
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030911.html.
215. Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments in Court: Power and Its Abuse, FINDLAW, Mar.
14, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020314.html.
216. Hamilton, supra note 214.
217. Id.
218. See id. (observing that “the Ten Commandments echo some of the rules that appear in
Hammurabi’s Code,” which was written “roughly one thousand years [before] the Ten
Commandments appeared”).
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Commandments is accurate, and that Catholics, Protestants and Jews have
competing lists.219 He concludes that
[m]onuments to the Ten Commandments . . . do not reflect an
objective or accurate representation of the historical development of
American law. Rarely have American lawmakers turned to the
Commandments for guidance. . . . Rather than reflecting our legal
heritage, to a great extent the Ten Commandments fly in the face of
the evolution of American law, which has been towards secular
freedoms and liberties and towards greater religious diversity. . . .
Thus, there is no historical foundation for a claim that a monument or
a plaque to the Ten Commandments, such as the ones at issue in the
Kentucky and Texas cases, are rooted in our legal and political
history.220
Finkelman agrees with Marci Hamilton that “[m]ost of the Commandments . . .
could not be enacted into law and withstand a constitutional challenge.”221
Steven K. Green of Willamette University Law School, who wrote his Ph.D.
history dissertation on this topic, prepared an amicus brief in McCreary that was
signed by twenty-seven noted legal historians, a veritable “who’s who” of the
field.222 After an exhaustive review of all the available influences on the drafting
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the brief notes that “the
Ten Commandments and biblical law received nary a mention in the debates and
publications surrounding the founding documents.”223 The brief’s signers agreed
that “the foundation of the law of the United States thus emanates from the nature
of representative government—what Jefferson called ‘the consent of the
governed’—and needs no external or divine authority for its support.”224 I could
easily list and quote from more scholars on this issue, but I think I have made my
point.
Hardly anyone disputes that most of the Constitution’s drafters were
Christians of various stripes, largely of heterodox views. But none, with the
possible exception of James Wilson of Pennsylvania, subscribed to the biblical
inerrancy doctrine of today’s Religious Right activists. This leads me to wonder
219. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1488-92 (2005). Finkelman notes that the Bible lists “at least thirteen
separate admonitions” in the “ten” commandments. Id. at 1488.
220. Id. at 1517.
221. Id. at 1518.
222. See Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at app. A.
223. Id. at 20.
224. Id.
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why Justice Breyer cited the unsupported and conclusory Justice Department
brief in his Van Orden concurrence,225 while apparently ignoring the wellsupported brief of the nation’s leading constitutional and legal historians. My
own suspicion is that Breyer wanted to avoid the “social conflict” that he feared
would follow a decision to remove the Decalogue monument from the Texas
State Capitol grounds and simply closed his eyes to the relevant evidence in the
case.226
IV. Which Side of the Border? Ten Commandments Cases After Van Orden
A. Justice Breyer Splits the Circuits
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden has created the unfortunate but
easily foreseeable consequence of forcing lower-court judges to confront a
difficult and “fact-intensive” question in deciding pending and future Ten
Commandments cases: is this case more like McCreary or more like Van
Orden?227 This inquiry requires judges to examine a host of subsidiary
questions. Was the display located inside or outside of a public building, or in a
distant park? Was it standing alone or surrounded by other documents or
monuments? Was it erected decades ago or recently? Was it initiated by public
officials or private citizens? Was it paid for or maintained by public or private
funds? Was its erection accompanied by religious comments from public
officials, clergy members, or private citizens? How much time elapsed between
its erection and a lawsuit challenging the display? In answering these questions,
and deciding on which side of Breyer’s “borderline” the answers fell, judges are
literally compelled to use a tally sheet, ticking off which factors carry the most
weight in reaching their decisions.
It is hardly surprising that federal appellate courts, given the conflicting
decisions in McCreary and Van Orden, and the divergent political and social
views among their judges, would inevitably reach different conclusions and a
second and similar circuit split would form after the 2005 Supreme Court
decisions.228 Whether the Justices will step into this jurisprudential mine field
225. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
226. See id. at 699.
227. Breyer seems to have foreseen these difficulties himself, emphasizing that in any
“borderline” case regarding a public display of the Ten Commandments, an inquiry into the factual
context of the display is required. See id. at 700-01.
228. Compare Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding Decalogue display on an Oklahoma county courthouse lawn unconstitutional), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010), with Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding a Fraternal Order of Eagles Decalogue display on the lawn of the former city hall
constitutional), and ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
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once again remains to be seen at this writing.229 We begin by examining two
recent cases from Nebraska and Washington state.
B. The Eagles Monument in Plattsmouth, Nebraska
Plattsmouth is a town of approximately 7000 residents in eastern Nebraska,
across the Mississippi River from Iowa.230 Back in 1965, the local Fraternal
Order of Eagles donated a Ten Commandments monument to the town, which
placed it in a forty-five-acre park some ten blocks from city hall.231 Like the
similar monument outside the Texas State Capitol, it was inscribed with two
Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and Rho to signify Christ.232 There are
apparently no surviving records of the town’s decision to accept the monument or
of remarks made at its installation.233 Thirty-six years passed before a town
resident, known as “John Doe” in court papers, filed suit in 2001 to seek its
removal, with the Nebraska ACLU as the lead plaintiff.234
After a federal district judge ruled for “Doe” and the ACLU, holding that the
monument violated the Establishment Clause,235 a divided panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.236 The City was later able,
however, to secure en banc review by all thirteen circuit judges, who reversed the
panel with only two dissenters in 2005,237 holding that “Van Orden governs our
resolution of this case.”238 Citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in that case, the
majority found that the monument’s location in a park, the time that had elapsed
before it was challenged, and its donation by a private group combined to allow
the “use of the text of the Ten Commandments to acknowledge the role of
religion in our Nation’s heritage.”239 The two dissenters viewed the Decalogue as
banc) (holding another Fraternal Order of Eagles Decalogue display in the city park constitutional).
229. Though the Court denied the county’s petition for certiorari in Green, see 130 S. Ct. 1687,
Liberty Counsel has filed a certiorari petition asking the Court to review the Sixth Circuit’s ruling,
on remand from the Court’s 2005 McCreary decision, to uphold Judge Coffman’s grant of a
permanent injunction, see ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 607 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010),
petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2010) (No. 10-566).
230. See COMMUNITY FACTS PLATTSMOUTH, NEBRASKA (2008), available at
http://sites.nppd.com/aedc/FactsBook/Plattsmouthbook.pdf.
231. See Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at 773-74.
232. See id. at 773.
233. See id. at 774 (noting that some city officials were involved in the monument’s installation,
though it is not known whether they were acting in their official capacities).
234. See id. at 773-74.
235. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D. Neb. 2002), aff’d,
358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
236. See 358 F.3d at 1042, 1050.
237. See 419 F.3d at 773, 778.
238. Id. at 776.
239. See id. at 776-78.
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“a command from the Judeo-Christian God on how he requires his followers to
live.”240 Labeling the Commandments as simply “an ‘acknowledgement of the
role of religion’ diminishes their sanctity to believers and belies the words
themselves,” the dissenters wrote, in an apparent reference to the commandment
against “graven images.”241
C. Another Eagles Monument in Everett, Washington
Everett, Washington, is a waterfront city north of Seattle whose more than
100,000 residents mostly work in the technology, aerospace, and service
industries.242 In 1959, the Eagles donated a Ten Commandments monument to
the city, inscribed like those in Plattsmouth and Austin with two Stars of David
and the Chi and Rho symbols of Christ.243 City officials originally installed it in
front of the city hall (now “Old City Hall”) in a ceremony attended by civic
leaders and church leaders, who, according to a contemporaneous announcement
in a local paper, were slated to offer an invocation and benediction.244
After a local resident, Jesse Card, filed suit against the City in 2003, aided by
volunteer lawyers from prestigious firms in Seattle and Washington, D.C., a
federal district judge ruled for the City in 2005.245 Ruling in March 2008, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld this
decision.246 The lengthy opinion reviewed the McCreary and Van Orden cases,
focusing on Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the latter.247 Citing such factors as
the monument’s private donor, the years that had elapsed before Jesse Card filed
suit, and the presence of other—although later-added—monuments around it, the
appellate panel found, as Breyer had in Van Orden, that the Everett monument
conveyed both “a secular moral message” and “a historical message.”248
Dismissing McCreary as factually dissimilar, and looking to the “context” of the
monument’s history and surroundings, the panel found it “clear that Van Orden
control[led the] decision.”249
240. Id. at 781 (Bye, J., dissenting).
241. See id.
242. Everett Washington USA, About Everett, http://www.everettwa.org/default.aspx? ID=314
(last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
243. Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2008).
244. See id. at 1010-12. In 1988, the City moved the monument a few feet from its original
location to make room for a war memorial, and it is now flanked by several other historical and
patriotic monuments and markers. See id. at 1011.
245. See Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1172, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d,
520 F.3d 1009.
246. Card, 520 F.3d at 1010, 1021.
247. See id. at 1017-21.
248. See id. at 1019-21.
249. Id. at 1021.
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Viewed in tandem, the Plattsmouth and Card cases, with their primary focus
on the factors that Breyer found “determinative” in his Van Orden
concurrence,250 established what I would describe—and not entirely facetiously—
as the “Breyer test.” Under this test, if a Decalogue display is old, donated by a
civic group like the Eagles, and unchallenged for decades, it passes constitutional
muster. But what if the display is new, donated by someone with clearly religious
motives, and promptly challenged by a lawsuit? Does that make a challenge to
the display a McCreary case, governed by these factors? What if a Ten
Commandments case involves some factors in Van Orden and some from
McCreary? These questions illustrate the dilemma faced by judges who are
called upon to resolve the conflicts posed in Decalogue cases.
V. “The Lord Had Burdened [My] Heart”—The Green v. Haskell County
Case
A. “I’m a Christian and I Believe in This”
Haskell County, Oklahoma, has much in common with McCreary County,
Kentucky. Both are small in population, with roughly 15,000 residents in each,
and poor; the median income in both counties is significantly less than the
national average.251 The 2000 census figures show that education levels in both
lag well behind other counties in their respective states and the rest of the
nation.252 Neither county is closer than sixty miles to a major city. Both are
conservative in politics; approximately seventy percent of the voters in each
backed John McCain over Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.253
250. See id. at 1010; ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776, 778 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc).
251. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Haskell County, Oklahoma,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/40/40061.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) [hereinafter
Haskell Facts] (estimating Haskell County’s population in 2009 at 12,393 and its 2008 median
household income at $34,327), and U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: McCreary
County, Kentucky, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21147.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
[hereinafter McCreary Facts] (estimating McCreary County’s population in 2009 at 17,795 and its
2008 median household income at $22,253), with CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at
5 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (estimating the national
median household income in 2008 at $50,303).
252. Compare Haskell Facts, supra note 251 (pegging the percent of high-school graduates
among persons age twenty-five and older at 66.9% in Haskell County, relative to 80.6% in
Oklahoma generally), and McCreary Facts, supra note 251 (placing the high school graduation rate
at 52.6% in McCreary County, compared to 74.1% in Kentucky generally), with State & County
QuickFacts, USA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
(showing the national high school graduation rate in 2000 to be 80.4%).
253. See N.Y. Times, Election Results 2008, Oklahoma: Presidential County Results (Dec. 9,
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Lastly, both are fundamentalist in religion, with Baptists laying claim to an
overwhelming majority of adherents in each county in 2000.254 Considering the
similarities between the two counties, it is not surprising that Ten
Commandments displays were installed in both, with local residents expressing
surprise and dismay that anyone would file a lawsuit to remove this symbol of the
Christian faith.255
The Ten Commandments display in Haskell County was erected in 2004 by
Mike Bush, a Southern Baptist lay minister who made his living as a construction
worker.256 Bush told the county’s three-member Board of Commissioners that
“the Lord had burdened [his] heart” to install a Decalogue monument on the
courthouse lawn in Stigler, the county seat and a town of some 2500 people.257
According to the recorded minutes of this meeting, “[t]he Board agreed that Mike
could go ahead and have the monument made and Mike is taking care of all the
expense.”258 Before the installation, but apparently without the commissioners’
knowledge or approval, Bush decided to have inscribed on the other side of the
monument the text of the Mayflower Compact, signed by the Plymouth Colony
settlers in 1620, and proclaiming, among other things, their devotion to “the glory
of God, and advancement of the Christian faith.”259
The Haskell County monument was dedicated on November 7, 2004, at a
ceremony attended by more than 100 people, including two of the three

2008), http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/president/oklahoma.html (showing that 69%
of Haskell County voters voted for McCain); N.Y Times Election Results 2008, Kentucky:
Presidential
County
Results
(Dec.
9,
2008),
http://elections.nytimes.com/
2008/results/states/preident/kentucky.html [hereinafter Kentucky: Presidential County Results]
(showing that 75% of McCreary County voters voted for McCain).
254. See The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), County Membership Report:
Haskell County, Oklahoma (2000) [hereinafter ARDA Haskell County Membership Report],
http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/counties/40061_2000_Rate.asp; ARDA, County
Membership Report: McCreary County, Kentucky (2000), http://www.thearda.com
/mapsReports/reports/counties/21147_2000.asp.
255. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 186. I mention the similarities between these counties, not to
denigrate their residents (and similar small towns and rural communities), but to stress that their
religious, racial, cultural, and political homogeneity, coupled with their geographic insularity and
isolation, distinguish them from larger cities and urban areas, where greater diversity in these factors
arguably engenders a corresponding tolerance of minorities and dissenters.
As an aside, calling the Decalogue a “Judeo-Christian” symbol is misleading; although the
Commandments come from the Hebrew scriptures, no Jews, to my knowledge, have initiated their
display in public places, and most Jewish groups oppose such displays.
256. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
257. See id. at 788, 790 (alteration in original).
258. Id. at 790.
259. See id. at 789-90.
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commissioners and representatives of seventeen churches.260 That same month,
one commissioner told a reporter, referring to the monument, “That’s what we’re
trying to live by, that right there. . . . I’m a Christian and I believe in this. I think
it’s a benefit to the community.”261
One person who did not think that the monument benefitted Haskell County
was a Stigler resident, James W. Green, who filed a suit against the Board of
Commissioners in October 2005, aided by the Oklahoma ACLU and one of its
volunteer lawyers, Micheal Salem of Norman.262 In response, Mike Bush
organized a “Support the Ten Commandments Monument” rally at the
courthouse the month after Green filed his suit.263 Attended by over three
hundred people, the rally featured local pastors and U.S. Senator Tom Coburn,264
a far-right Republican, who said, “I wish this was in every courthouse on the lawn
. . . . We need more of this, not less.”265 Mike Bush reported that over 2800
signatures had been collected on a petition supporting the monument.266 “My
heart is thankful to see so many people coming out,” he said.267 “All our laws are
based on the 10 laws up here on our courthouse lawn.”268 One of the county
commissioners stirred the crowd with a defiant pledge: “I’ll stand up in front of
that monument and if you bring a bulldozer up here you’ll have to push me down
with it,”269 a pretty clear indication of the “divisiveness” the Supreme Court had
identified in McCreary and that Justice Breyer sought to avoid in the Van Orden
case.270
Jim Green’s suit came before federal district judge Ronald A. White, named to
the bench by President George W. Bush.271 Sitting in nearby Muskogee, seat of
the federal Eastern District of Oklahoma, White conducted a two-day bench trial
260. See id. at 791.
261. Id. at 792.
262. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1274, 1279 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784.
263. See Green, 568 F.3d at 792.
264. Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
265. Coburn Attends Ten Commandments Monument Rally, FOX NEWS, Nov. 20, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176158,00.html.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
270. See discussion supra Parts II.D & III.A.
271. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784; Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj [hereinafter FJC Directory] (select “W”
hyperlink from alphabetical list; then follow “White, Ronald A.” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 3,
2010).
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in May 2006.272 Mike Salem appeared for Green; opposing him, and
representing Haskell County, was Kevin Theriot, a staff lawyer in Kansas for the
Arizona-based Alliance Defense Fund,273 a Religious Right legal group whose
stated mission is to promote “the spread of the Gospel through the legal defense
of religious freedom”274 and that affirms the Bible as “the inspired, infallible,
authoritative Word of God.”275
Ruling on August 18, 2006, Judge White relied on Van Orden in holding that
the Haskell County monument “did not overstep the constitutional line
demarcating government neutrality toward religion.”276 He noted that the
courthouse lawn featured several other monuments, including those honoring war
veterans and recognizing the Choctaw Indians.277 “A reasonable observer would
see that the [Decalogue] Monument is not the focus of the courthouse lawn,”
White wrote, adding, “The mélange of monuments surrounding the one at issue
here obviously detract from any religious message that may be conveyed by the
Commandments.”278 Revealing his personal view that the Green case was hardly
worth his time, White dubbed it a “kerfuffle,” implying in effect that it was much
ado about nothing.279
B. “The Religious Message of the Monument”
Jim Green’s appeal from Judge White’s ruling was filed in the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in September 2006.280 Almost three years passed
before a three-judge panel issued its unanimous opinion on June 8, 2009.281
Writing for the panel, Judge Jerome Holmes reversed Judge White’s ruling,
finding this case more like McCreary than Van Orden.282 Holmes focused on the
facts that the Haskell County monument had been recently installed, that Green
272. See Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
273. See id.
274. Alliance
Defense
Fund,
About
the
Alliance
Defense
Fund,
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/About [hereinafter About ADF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
275. Id. (follow “ADF Statement of Faith & Guiding Principles” hyperlink).
276. See Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-91, 1296-97.
277. See id. at 1274-75. Native Americans make up roughly fifteen percent of the county’s
residents. Haskell Facts, supra note 251.
278. Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
279. Id. at 1274.
280. 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, appeal docketed, No. 06-7098 (10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2006).
281. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010). All of the members of the panel were named to the bench by
President George W. Bush and hardly represent the kind of liberal “activist” judges that
conservatives excoriate. See FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “H” and “O” hyperlinks from
alphabetical list; then follow “Hartz, Harris L.,” “Holmes, Jerome A.,” and “O’Brien, Terrence L.”
hyperlinks).
282. See Green, 568 F.3d at 807-09.
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had filed suit within a year of its erection, and that county commissioners had
supported the monument with religious comments.283 Any “reasonable observer”
of the monument, Holmes wrote, “would have been left with the clear
impression—not counteracted by the individual commissioners or the Board
collectively—that the commissioners were speaking on behalf of the government
and the government was endorsing the religious message of the Monument.”284
On this point, after quoting the commissioners’ religious comments made in
support of the monument, Holmes noted that “[i]n a small community like
Haskell County, where everyone knows everyone,” such statements of opinion
would be perceived as government speech.285 Indeed, one commissioner
described his post as a “24 hours a day, 7 days a week” job.286 In this regard,
Haskell County more resembled McCreary County, Kentucky, than Austin,
Texas.
After this judicial setback, Kevin Theriot asked the Tenth Circuit for an en
banc review of the panel’s decision by the full bench of twelve active judges.287
Ruling on July 30, 2009, the judges denied the request by a six-to-six vote.288 All
six judges who voted to rehear the case had been named to the bench by
Republican presidents.289 Between them, the six dissenters issued two lengthy
opinions, while the six judges favoring denial of review remained silent, as is
normal in voting against en banc review.290 In both opinions, the dissenters
castigated the panel for finding the Green case more like McCreary than Van
Orden.291
Writing for himself and three colleagues, Judge Neil Gorsuch called the panel
decision “simply inconsistent with the most analogous decision of the Supreme
Court.”292 The most important factors to Gorsuch were the secular monuments
that surrounded the Ten Commandments on the courthouse lawn, which he felt
diminished the Decalogue’s religious message, and the monument’s donation by a
283. See id. at 801-02, 807.
284. See id. at 803.
285. See id.
286. Id. at 801.
287. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1235 (10th Cir. 2009)
(denying Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc).
288. See id. A majority is required to grant en banc review. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
289. FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “H,” “K,” “M,” “O,” and “T” hyperlinks from
alphabetical list; then follow “Hartz, Harris L.,” “Holmes, Jerome A.,” “Kelly, Paul Joseph Jr.,”
“McConnell, Michael W.,” “O’Brien, Terrence L.,” “Tacha, Deanell Reece,” and “Tymkovich,
Timothy M.” hyperlinks). Recall, however, as noted above, that all three members of the panel that
reversed Judge White’s ruling had also been appointed by Republicans. See supra note 281.
290. See Green, 574 F.3d 1235.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 1249 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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private citizen, Mike Bush.293 Admitting that the conflicting decisions in
McCreary and Van Orden were difficult to reconcile and apply, Gorsuch
maintained, “[W]e should all be able to agree at least that cases like Van Orden
should come out like Van Orden.”294
In an opinion joined by two colleagues, Judge Paul Kelly noted the inscription
on the monument, “Erected by Citizens of Haskell County,” and also cited the
“context” of nearby monuments, concluding that these factors left “little doubt
that the government itself did not communicate a predominantly religious
message, but rather was merely providing space for yet another donated
monument related to Haskell County’s history.”295 In my view, Kelly’s statement
was more than a bit disingenuous, as if the courthouse lawn were little more than
a community bulletin board. Kevin Theriot responded to the en banc denial with
a thinly veiled broadside at Jim Green: “Americans shouldn’t be forced to
abandon their religious heritage simply to appease someone’s political agenda,”
he said.296 “The emotional response of a single, offended passerby does not
amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause.”297 Theriot did not mention
that the Alliance Defense Fund has its own political and religious agenda, which
includes “the spread of the Gospel” through legal attacks on abortion rights and
same-sex marriage.298 The ACLU, of course, also has its own political agenda,
supporting legal defenses of those divisive issues.299 Courtroom battles over the
Ten Commandments have thus become skirmishes in the wider “culture war”
between those with very different views of the proper role of religion in American
society.
C. How Many Times Can You Say “Historical Significance”?
The Supreme Court granted review in the McCreary and Van Orden cases to
resolve a “circuit split” between the appellate courts that struck down the Ten
Commandments display in the Kentucky courthouse and upheld the monument on
the Texas State Capitol grounds.300 However, thanks (or no thanks) to Justice
Breyer’s concurrence in the latter case, lower-court judges have since been forced
293. See id. at 1246-48.
294. Id. at 1249.
295. Id. at 1235, 1238-39 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
296. Eric Young, Christian Legal Group Mulls Appeal Options Following ‘Commandments’
Ruling, CHRISTIAN POST, June 11, 2009, http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090611/ christianlegal-group-mulls-appeal-options-following-commandments-ruling/.
297. Id.
298. See About ADF, supra note 274.
299. See, e.g., ACLU, Key Issues, http://www.aclu.org/key-issues/relationships (last visited Oct.
3, 2010) (listing “Reproductive Freedom” and “LGBT Rights” among fifteen key issues advocated
by the organization).
300. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
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to decide, in pending and future Ten Commandments cases, whether challenged
displays should be governed by McCreary or by Van Orden.301 As we have seen,
circuit courts in the Plattsmouth and Card cases relied on Van Orden for
guidance,302 while the Tenth Circuit panel in the Green case found the challenged
Decalogue monument more like McCreary.303
This subsequent “circuit split,” among other things, prompted Kevin Theriot
to ask the Supreme Court to resolve the lower-court conflicts that Breyer’s
concurrence had produced.304 Theriot filed the certiorari petition in Green with
the Supreme Court on October 28, 2009, quoting extensively—not
surprisingly—from the opinions of Judges Kelly and Gorsuch, dissenting from
the Tenth Circuit’s denial of en banc review of the unanimous panel decision.305
He placed special emphasis on Gorsuch’s statement that “cases like Van Orden
should come out like Van Orden.”306 Downplaying the undeniable religious
message of the Commandments, Theriot stressed instead the purported
“historical significance” of the Decalogue in America’s legal heritage, repeating
this phrase no less than seven times in his thirty-three-page petition.307 Whatever
“historical significance” the Commandments may have for residents of Haskell
County or other communities in which they are displayed depends entirely upon
the divine sanction they provide for the criminal prohibitions of murder, adultery,
theft, and perjury. Yet, as discussed above, every reputable scholar in this field
has shown that this supposed “nexus” between the religious commands of the
Decalogue and those prohibitions is simply lacking.308
Theriot summed up his appeal for Supreme Court review in these words:
Circuit courts need this Court’s guidance on the proper analysis to apply to
monuments passively acknowledging religion’s historical significance that are
part of historical displays on government grounds. Otherwise, these cases will
continue to be decided on irrelevant facts like those that led to the finding of
unconstitutionality in this case.309

301. See discussion supra Parts IV, V.A-B.
302. See discussion supra Parts IV.B-C.
303. See discussion supra Part V.B.
304. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 22-28.
305. See, e.g, id. at 13 (quoting Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 574 F.3d 1235,
1237 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting)); id. at 15 (quoting Green, 574 F.3d at 1247 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting)).
306. See id. at 9, 33 (quoting Green, 574 F.3d at 1249 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).
307. See id. at 6 n.1, 7, 9, 11, 12, 30. The phrase also appears in the Questions Presented
section of the Petition. See id. at i.
308. See discussion supra Part III.B.
309. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 9.
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Theriot also identified the facts he found “irrelevant”: “the age of the monument, how
quickly it was challenged, whether it was displayed by a small or large town, and the
personal religious views of the government officials who allowed it.”310
D. How Many Times Can You Say “Context”?
Jim Green’s lawyers filed their brief in opposition to Kevin Theriot’s certiorari
petition with the Supreme Court on January 11, 2010.311 Submitted by Dan
Mach of the ACLU’s Washington, D.C. office as the Counsel of Record,312 the
brief urged the Justices to deny review of the Tenth Circuit panel decision on two
main grounds. First, Mach argued that the religious statements of Mike Bush and
the county commissioners, before and after the Ten Commandments monument
was installed, demonstrated an official “endorsement” of its sectarian message.313
Mach devoted four pages of his brief to documenting these statements.314
Second, and not surprisingly, he argued that the overall “context” of the
monument distinguished it from the one on the Texas State Capitol grounds in
the Van Orden case, making it more analogous to the Kentucky courthouse
display in McCreary, as the Tenth Circuit panel had concluded.315 In fact, Mach
used the words “context” and “contextual” nearly fifty times in the body of his
thirty-four-page brief.316
Even if the Tenth Circuit panel “had viewed this case solely through the lens of
Van Orden,” Mach argued, the Haskell County “monument still would not have
passed constitutional muster because there are significant, material distinctions
between this display and the monument in Van Orden.”317 He cited such factors
as the board members’ public support of the Haskell County monument, the lack
of a unifying secular theme on the courthouse lawn, and the community
“divisiveness” the monument sparked.318 Mach did not rely solely on these
factors, however, stressing that the Tenth Circuit panel had reviewed “the record
as a whole” in the case, and the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the

310. Id. at 8.
311. See generally Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs v.
Green, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010) (No. 09-531), 2010 WL 169503.
312. See id. at cover.
313. Id. at 27 (arguing that the commissioners’ public statements and the photograph taken next
to the monument constituted “endorsement”).
314. See id. at 5-9.
315. See id. at 26-31; see also Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
316. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 311, passim.
317. Id. at 26.
318. See id. at 26-30.
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monument’s erection, and had not singled out any factors as “determinative” in
its ruling.319
In contrast to Theriot’s petition, Mach dismissed the asserted “circuit split”
with the decisions in the Plattsmouth and Card cases with hardly a glance,
conceding that those monuments satisfied the factors in Justice Breyer’s Van
Orden concurrence.320 In effect, the ACLU signaled its willingness to allow these
and other “old” monuments, mostly donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, to
remain standing. In my view, this would be an unfortunate (but understandable)
consequence of the ACLU’s effort to confine the Supreme Court’s decision in the
Green case, either in denying review or upholding the Tenth Circuit decision on
the narrowest possible grounds, a strategy that lawyers often employ in dealing
with “circuit-split” cases. What Mach was saying, in essence, was that “cases
like McCreary should come out like McCreary.”321 This one did, Mach
concluded, and thus did not warrant Supreme Court review or reversal of the
Tenth Circuit’s panel decision.322
E. “We All Love Jesus Christ”—The Grayson Case from Kentucky
Three days after Dan Mach filed the ACLU’s opposition brief in the Green
case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed Kevin Theriot a gift-wrapped
present for his reply brief, which he submitted to the Supreme Court on January
25, 2010.323 Ruling on January 14, two members of a three-judge panel reversed
a district court decision that ordered the removal of a Ten Commandments
display from the courthouse wall in Grayson County, Kentucky.324
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in ACLU of Kentucky v. Grayson County merits
attention for two reasons. First, it reveals the impact on Ten Commandments
cases of appellate judges with right-wing ideological axes to grind, who are
willing to “distinguish” controlling precedent and distort case records to reach a
“result-oriented” outcome.325 Second, the community response to that decision
exposes the sectarian religious motivations of the Christian majority in Grayson
County that supported the Decalogue display in their courthouse.

319. See id. at 25.
320. See id. at 18-19 (citing with approval Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th
Cir. 2008), and ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2005)).
321. Cf. Green, 574 F.3d at 1249 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying
note 294.
322. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 311, at 30-31.
323. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Green, 130 S. Ct. 1687
(2010) (No. 09-531), 2010 WL 320373.
324. See ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2010).
325. See id. at 861 (Moore, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s unconvincing attempt to rely
on ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2005), as precedent).
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The Grayson case began in September 2001, when Reverend Chester Shartzer,
pastor of the Clearview Baptist Church in the county seat of Leitchfield, appeared
before the county’s governing body, the Grayson County Fiscal Court, expressing
“his desire for the County to place the Ten Commandments in the County
buildings.”326 Tucked in the coal field region of central Kentucky, Grayson
County—much like McCreary County in the state’s eastern region—is small and
rural,327 and conservative in politics and religion. Its voters backed John McCain
by a two-to-one majority over Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election,328
and evangelical Protestants outnumber other denominations by a similar
margin.329
Reverend Shartzer likely knew that Judge Coffman had ruled that a display of
the Decalogue with other “historical documents” in the McCreary County
courthouse was a “sham” and violated the Establishment Clause.330 But he was
not dissuaded, explaining to the Fiscal Court members that “the Civil Liberties
would look more favorable toward it if [the Ten Commandments] were hanging
in a grouping with the other historical documents.”331 The County’s attorney,
Tom Goff, warned the Fiscal Court members that “there could be law suits filed
against the County,”332 but they unanimously approved Shartzer’s request to post
the Decalogue in the courthouse along with the “historical documents” that Judge
Coffman had rejected in McCreary County,333 thus setting the stage for another
Ten Commandments lawsuit.
326. See id. at 841 (majority opinion); see also Linda B. Blackford, Ten Commandments Back
Up in Courthouse, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 19, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.kentucky.com/2010/01/19/1100913/crowd-praises-the-return-of-10.html.
327. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Grayson County, Kentucky,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21085.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (estimating
Grayson County’s population in 2009 at 25,581 and its 2008 median household income at
$33,791; identifying the high-school graduation rate in 2000 among persons age twenty-five and
older as 62.8%), with McCreary Facts, supra note 251.
328. See Kentucky: Presidential County Results, supra note 253. With 120 counties, most of
them small, rural, and conservative, Kentucky is an ideal spawning ground for Ten Commandments
cases, with displays in more than a dozen counties.
329. See The Association of Religion Data Archives, County Membership Report: Grayson
County, Kentucky (2000), http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/counties/21085_
2000.asp.
330. See ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848-51; see also supra text
accompanying notes 129-30.
331. ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’g 2008 WL
859279 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
332. Id.
333. Compare id., with ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County (McCreary II), 145 F. Supp. 2d
845, 846, 853 (E.D.Ky. 2001) (listing identical sets of “historical documents” included in the
Grayson County and McCreary County displays); see also supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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Shartzer’s prediction that the ACLU “would look more favorable toward” the
Grayson County display proved wrong. At the request of two county residents,
Ed Meredith and Raymond Harper, the Kentucky ACLU filed suit in 2001.334
Once again, as in the McCreary case, Grayson County was represented by
Mathew Staver of Liberty Counsel, among others,335 who had no doubt provided
Shartzer with a list of the same “historical documents” that were displayed in
McCreary County. The Ten Commandments were removed from the Grayson
County courthouse after federal district judge Joseph McKinley granted the
ACLU’s preliminary injunction request, but further proceedings were placed on
hold pending the outcome of appeals to the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court
in McCreary.336 When he finally ruled in 2008, granting a permanent injunction
against displaying the Ten Commandments in the courthouse, Judge McKinley
held that county officials had “never considered a secular purpose for the
display,” thus violating the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test.337
When the County’s appeal from Judge McKinley’s ruling came before a threejudge panel of the Sixth Circuit, Staver already had two sure votes in his pocket.
Judge David McKeague was a longtime Republican activist and party official in
Michigan, and was reportedly named to the bench by President George W.
Bush—over the opposition of both Michigan senators—as a reward for legal
work on behalf of Bush’s father.338 McKeague is also a member of the Federalist
Society,339 an influential organization of conservative lawyers and judges. Senior
district judge Karl Forester of Kentucky, who sat on the panel by designation, had
already upheld an identical Ten Commandments display in his district.340
Writing for himself and Judge Forester, McKeague conceded that the
documents in the Grayson County courthouse “match exactly” those in the
McCreary County display the Supreme Court had ruled against.341 McKeague
opined, however, that judges “must be alert to distinguishing facts” in similar

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Grayson, 591 F.3d at 842.
See Grayson, 2008 WL 859279.
Grayson, 2008 WL 859279, at *3.
Id. at *9.
See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, SIXTH CIRCUIT NOMINEE DAVID W. MCKEAGUE: DISTRICT
COURT JUDGE, WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 1-2, http://www.statebarwatch.org/docs/afj.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
339. Id. at 1.
340. See ACLU of Ky. V. Rowan County, 513 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892, 905 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
Compare id. at 892, with ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 2010)
(listing identical collections of “historical documents” in the Rowan and Grayson county courthouse
displays).
341. Grayson, 591 F.3d at 841 n.1. The identical composition of the displays is not surprising,
considering that Liberty Counsel consulted on both.
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cases.342 Lawyers and judges can always “distinguish” two cases if they try hard
enough, and McKeague found two facts to “distinguish” the Grayson County and
McCreary cases. First, the Grayson display was donated by a private citizen,
Reverend Shartzer; and second, no Grayson County officials made religious
remarks about the display’s installation.343 Finding both “historical and
educational” value in the display,344 McKeague deferred to the County’s “stated
secular purpose” and held that the overall display “endorse[d] an educational
message rather than a religious one.”345
In a pointed dissent, Judge Karen Nelson Moore—named to the bench by
President Bill Clinton346—took McKeague to task for ignoring the clear evidence
in the case record that posting the Decalogue in the courthouse was considered by
county officials as separate from and unrelated to the “historical documents” that
surrounded it.347 Citing the minutes of the Fiscal Court meetings, she said that
the record “clearly indicate[d] that the predominant purpose was to post the Ten
Commandments as a religious text and that the additional, ‘Historical
Documents’ were added merely to avoid violating the Constitution.”348 Nothing
was said at these meetings about the “historical” or “educational” nature of the
Decalogue, Moore observed.349 She concluded, “The County’s asserted purpose
here—that the Display was posted for educational or historical reasons—is a
sham and should be rejected.”350
The response of Grayson County residents to their victory in the Sixth Circuit
made clear their religious motivation—dismissed by Judge McKeague—in
displaying the Decalogue in their courthouse. On January 18, 2010, several
hundred people gathered at the courthouse for a jubilant celebration. “Amid
anthems, hymns, and plenty of ‘amens,’ a copy of the Ten Commandments was
placed back on the wall at the Grayson County courthouse,” one reporter
wrote.351 The same reporter quoted one spectator as saying, “We all love Jesus
Christ . . . . This represents our savior, and it’s the law we have to go by.”352
County magistrate Presto Gary suggested that the long legal battle had been
worth the effort: “If we don’t get something back for Christian people to believe
342. Id. at 848.
343. See id. at 849-54.
344. Id. at 853.
345. Id. at 849, 855.
346. FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “M” hyperlink from alphabetical list; then follow
“Moore, Karen Nelson” hyperlink).
347. See Grayson, 591 F.3d at 857-58 (Moore, J., dissenting).
348. Id.
349. See id. at 858.
350. Id. at 857.
351. See Blackford, supra note 326.
352. Id.
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in, what kind of shape will our country be in?” he asked.353 “But we had faith and
kept praying.”354 As the Ten Commandments were placed back in their frame,
“the crowd spontaneously broke into God Bless America, and Amazing Grace.
Afterward, everyone crowded around a big sheet cake emblazoned with an
American flag.”355 Fittingly, the celebration ended with a prayer by Reverend
Shartzer, who exulted, “I’m so proud of the Christian leadership we’ve had in
Grayson County.”356
Needless to say, Kevin Theriot cited the Grayson decision in his reply brief for
Green as further evidence of the “circuit split” he asked the Supreme Court to
resolve in his favor.357 He noted that the Sixth Circuit “upheld a display identical
to the one that this Court considered in McCreary.”358 If that were the case, one
might ask, why wouldn’t McCreary control both the Green and Grayson cases?
With McCreary as controlling precedent, my opinion, for what it’s worth, is that
the Tenth Circuit got it right in Green and the Sixth Circuit got it wrong in
Grayson.
Conclusion: A Challenge and a “Modest Proposal”
My argument for the presumptive unconstitutionality of Ten Commandments
displays on public property rests on three facts. First, the Decalogue undeniably
is a religious text, taken from the Hebrew scriptures in the Bible and adopted as
an article of faith by virtually all Christians, especially those in conservative
evangelical denominations. The first three commandments are exclusively
religious in nature, with no “secular” meaning or force whatever. Three other
commandments contain moral admonitions (observe the Sabbath, honor one’s
parents, and do not covet one’s neighbors’ goods or wives) that cannot be enacted
into law.
Second, the acts of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury that are prohibited by
the other four commandments have been subject to criminal sanction and
punishment in virtually every known code of laws, both formal and customary,
since long before the Decalogue was incorporated into the Bible, and in societies
that are not Jewish or Christian. Legal historians and anthropologists agree that
these prohibitions are universal and not culture-specific. They simply reflect
common recognition of the obvious harm these acts inflict on individuals and
society, and do not depend on divine sanction. Those who worshipped multiple

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 3 n.1.
Id.
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gods in ancient Egypt or in Hindu cultures, and even modern atheists who believe
in no god, considered or still consider themselves bound by these prohibitions.
Third, and most important for this argument, the alleged “nexus” between the
Ten Commandments and contemporary American law simply does not exist. The
Decalogue has never been a significant “source” of that law, from the framing of
the Constitution until today. Without exception, reputable legal historians agree
on this issue. Lacking any “but-for” connection between the Commandments and
the criminal law of every American state and the federal government, arguments
for their display in public places rest on nothing more than the religious sentiment
of Christian majorities.
I welcome those Decalogue defenders who wish to rebut these claims to make
that effort. But I also challenge them to answer, with more than mere assertion,
the following five questions: First, do you deny that the Decalogue is a religious
text and rests its commandments on divine sanction? Second, do you deny that a
display of the first three commandments, by themselves, would violate the
Establishment Clause? Third, do you deny that prohibitions against murder,
theft, adultery, and perjury have been universal in every recorded culture, before
and after the Bible was written? Fourth, can you identify a single reputable
scholar who has demonstrated that the Constitution’s framers relied on the
Decalogue as a significant source of American law? If so, provide names,
academic affiliations, and scholarly publications. Fifth, can you identify a single
Decalogue display that was not initiated by an individual or group with express
religious professions?359
I have a final challenge to defenders of the Haskell County monument. In May
2006, the commissioners—clearly on the advice of their lawyers—adopted a
policy statement that prohibited the county from denying placement of displays
on the courthouse lawn on the basis of viewpoint.360 Let me propose that a
359. It is worth noting that the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which donated the Ten
Commandments monument at the Texas State Capitol and similar monuments to about 150 other
towns and cities, requires that its members profess belief in a “supreme being.” Robert V. Ritter,
Supreme Scandal: How the Supreme Court Blessed the Ten Commandments (Nov. 23, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.jmcenter.org/pages/supreme_scandal.html. The fraternity
has also stated in official publications that the Decalogue embodies God’s “rules” and that “the
kingdom of heaven belongs to those who live by them. That was Christ’s promise to us.”
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, ON EAGLE WINGS 93 (1958), available at
http://www.jmcenter.org/comicbook/OEW_093.jpg. Thus, despite the ostensibly “secular” purpose
of donating the monuments to combat “juvenile delinquency,” the Eagles are clearly a sectarian
religious organization. See generally Sue A. Hoffman, The Real History of the Ten
Commandments Project, of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, http://www.religioustolerance.org/
hoffman01.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
360. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1275 n.3 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009); Michael Smith, Display Policy
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county resident offer to erect a display that includes these quotes from three of
the founding fathers: (1) “[T]he government of the United States is not in any
sense founded on the Christian Religion”–The Treaty of Peace and Friendship
(Tripoli), signed by President John Adams in 1796;361 (2) “Christianity neither is,
nor ever was a part of the common law”–Thomas Jefferson;362 3) “During almost
fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What
have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the clergy,
ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry, and
persecution”–James Madison.363
This proposal would put the commissioners to the test on their supposedly
“viewpoint-neutral” policy. But it would promptly be rejected, unless I’m
seriously mistaken. In its place, let me offer a more modest proposal—that the
commissioners replace the existing Decalogue monument with one that is headed
“Commandments of Oklahoma Law” and states, “1) You shall not commit
murder; 2) You shall not steal; 3) You shall not commit adultery; and 4) You
shall not commit perjury.”364 That would convey the Decalogue’s “obey the law”
message without any religious surplusage. This obviously won’t happen, either,
and the proposal is effectively mooted by the removal of the Haskell County
monument in March 2010 to adjoining property of the American Legion.
Nonetheless, the proposal still serves to point out (to me, at least) the hypocrisy
of those who insist that the “obey the law” message can only be conveyed by
display of all ten commandments, and puts supporters of this and other
Decalogue monuments (such as that proposed on the Oklahoma State Capitol
grounds) to the test for adherence to supposedly “viewpoint-neutral” policies.
Finally, I’m not so naïve as to believe that any federal judge or Supreme Court
Justice will agree that public display of the Decalogue is presumptively
unconstitutional, although acceptance of my argument would spare them the
onerous task of deciding whether a challenged display (like that in Haskell
County) is more like McCreary or Van Orden. However, I would propose that
they apply, in pending and future cases, the “endorsement” test of Justice
O’Connor and the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test. If they do,
as did the Tenth Circuit panel in the Green case, it seems clear to me that such

Is Called a “Sham,” TULSA WORLD, Apr. 1, 2006.
361. Treaty of Peace & Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, art. XI, Nov. 4, 1796, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1796t.asp.
362. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Feb. 10, 1814), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefLett.html (follow “Letter Cooper” hyperlink).
363. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENT ¶ 7
(1785), available at http://religiousfreedoom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html.
364. See 21 OKLA STAT. §§ 701.7-.8 (2001) (murder); id. §§ 791, 1701 (theft); id. §§ 871
(adultery); id. § 491 (perjury).
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displays will be struck down as violations of the Establishment Clause. The
Supreme Court’s denial of Haskell County’s certiorari petition in March 2010
leaves a final resolution of this issue still unclear, however, since (at this writing)
the Court has not ruled on the certiorari petition filed by Liberty Counsel in the
second round of the McCreary case, wherein the Counsel has asked for review of
the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on remand affirming Judge Coffman’s grant of a
permanent injunction in that case.365 We should learn the fate of this latest
petition by late February or March 2011, but I’m virtually certain the Court will
deny it, given the factual similarities of the McCreary County and Haskell County
cases. I may, of course, be wrong. In the meantime, I hope readers of this essay
will consider seriously the argument I have presented, and I welcome their
responses.

365. See ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 607 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010), petition for cert.
filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2010) (No. 10-566); see also supra note 229.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

